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OF MEAT AND MANHOOD 
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
 
[P]ity the male vegetarian who needs real courage and fortitude, as 
he is battered from all sides by the incomprehension and ridicule of 
the world around him. 
—Barbara Ellen1 
You are what you eat. So make it a Hungry-Man. With a full pound 
of meat and potatoes, you can eat like a man and be full like a man. 
—Hungry-Man Frozen Dinner Advertisement2 
You don‘t even eat steak dude. At what point in time did you realize 
you were gay? 
—Complaint, Pacifico v. Calyon in the Americas3 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Sandra Day O‘Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. For 
helpful comments and suggestions at various stages of this Article‘s progress, I am grateful to Kelli 
Alces, Miriam Baer, Carlos Ball, Aaron Bruhl, Jack Chin, Adam Chodorow, Rhiannon Cornelius, 
Linda Demaine, Mike Dorff, Dave Fagundes, Mary Anne Franks, David Gartner, Andy Hessick, 
Carissa Hessick, RonNell Andersen Jones, Liz Kukura, Mike Lauro, Justin Marceau, Dan Markel, 
Steven Pinker, Corie Rosen, Cliff Rofksy, Betsy Rosenblatt, Mary Sigler, Judy Stinson, Doug 
Sylvester, and Chris Whytock. I am especially indebted to Carissa Hessick for her suggestions and 
encouragement at the early stages of this project, without which I never would have pursued this topic, 
and to Craig B. Haircuth for his invaluable research assistance. I am also grateful for the comments 
and suggestions I received when I presented earlier drafts of this Article at the Southern California 
Junior Faculty Workshop, the Rocky Mountain Junior Faculty Workshop at University of Utah, 
Prawfsfest Junior Faculty Workshop, and Arizona State‘s general faculty workshop and junior faculty 
workshop. Any and all mistakes are, of course, my own. 
 1. Barbara Ellen, It Takes a Real Man to Say He Enjoys Tofu, THE OBSERVER (England), July 
27, 2008, at 11. 
 2. HUNGRY MAN TV COMMERCIAL, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZaPcBwmCtiM (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 3. Complaint at 5, Pacifico v. Calyon in the Americas, No. 100992-2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 
2009). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the fast food chain Burger King began airing a television 
advertisement for its new Texas Double Whopper, titled ―Manthem.‖4 The 
commercial featured a musical number, complete with elaborate 
choreography and intricate stunt work, sung to the tune of Helen Reddy‘s 
classic song ―I am Woman.‖5 In the original version of the song, Reddy 
sings about female empowerment, famously declaring, ―I am strong, I am 
invincible, I am woman.‖6 The singer in Burger King‘s man-minded 
version, by contrast, belts out that he is ―way too hungry to settle for chick 
 
 
 4. Burger King, Manthem/I Am Man (2006) [hereinafter Manthem], available at http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=v9e4QD1zm0Q. 
 5. HELEN REDDY, I Am Woman, on I AM WOMAN (Capitol Records 1971). 
 6. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/1
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food.‖7 Neither tofu nor quiche can satisfy his appetite; only the Texas 
Double Whopper will do.
8
 As he sings at the end of the song, ―I am 
hungry, I am incorrigible, I am man.‖9 
Of course, the commercial is not meant to be taken too seriously. The 
last thing we would expect a ravenously hungry man to do is break into 
song about a hamburger. Nor would we expect him to be joined by 
hundreds of other hungry men on parade.
10
 And the sight gags are 
intentionally over the top—the parading men burn their underwear 
(instead of their bras), they overturn a minivan, and they punch each other 
in the stomach, all the while devouring their Texas Double Whoppers.
11
 
Yet the commercial works because it taps into a stereotype about the 
relationship between meat and manhood.  
The idea that ―real‖ men eat meat is firmly embedded in our culture.12 
For those men who are benefitted by the stereotype, eating meat serves as 
a confirmation of their manhood, a kind of marker of their privileged 
status as masculine men. This is not the case for men who do not eat meat. 
In our culture, a man who does not eat meat is often seen as insufficiently 
masculine.  
Take Prince Fielder. Fielder plays first base for the Milwaukee 
Brewers.
13
 Standing five-foot-eleven inches tall and weighing 275 
pounds,
14
 Fielder is one of the most powerful hitters in all of professional 
baseball. He is also vegetarian. According to a New York Times story 
 
 
 7. Manthem, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. (―Oh, yes I‘m a guy, I‘ll admit I‘ve been fed quiche/Waive tofu bye bye, now it‘s for 
Whopper beef I reach.‖). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FEMINIST-VEGETARIAN CRITICAL 
THEORY (20th anniversary ed. 2010); ALAN BEARDSWORTH & TERESA KEIL, SOCIOLOGY ON THE 
MENU: AN INVITATION TO THE STUDY OF FOOD AND SOCIETY (1997); JEREMY RIFKIN, BEYOND BEEF: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CATTLE CULTURE (1992); Alan Beardsworth & Teresa Keil, The 
Vegetarian Option: Varieties, Conversions, Motives, and Careers, 40 SOC. REV. 253 (1992); C. 
Wesley Buerkle, Metrosexuality can Stuff It: Beef Consumption as (Heteromasculine) Fortification, 29 
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE Q. 77 (2009); Bettina Heinz & Ronald Lee, Getting Down to the Meat: The 
Symbolic Construction of Meat Consumption, 49 COMM. STUD. 86 (1998); Richard A. Rogers, Beasts, 
Burgers, and Hummers: Meat and the Crisis of Masculinity in Contemporary Television 
Advertisements, 2 ENVTL. COMM. 281 (2008); Jeffrey Sobal, Men, Meat, and Marriage: Models of 
Masculinity, 13 FOOD & FOODWAYS 135 (2005); Julia Twigg, Vegetarianism and the Meanings of 
Meat, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF FOOD AND EATING: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
FOOD 18 (Anne Murcott ed., 1983); Barbara E. Willard, The American Story of Meat: Discursive 
Influences on Cultural Eating Practice, 36 J. POPULAR CULTURE 105 (2002). 
 13. See Prince Fielder Career Statistics, http://milwaukee.brewers.mlb.com/team/player.jsp? 
player_id=425902 (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
290 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:287 
 
 
 
 
about his vegetarianism, Fielder gave up eating meat after reading about 
and becoming ―totally grossed out‖ by the treatment of cattle and 
chicken.
15
 As soon as his decision became public, fans and critics 
questioned whether Fielder‘s game would suffer on account of his new 
diet.
16
 Although it goes unsaid, these concerns are based on a gender 
stereotype, namely, that athletes need to eat meat in order to be successful; 
they will become less athletic—and therefore less masculine—if meat is 
not part of their diet.
17
 Not surprisingly, Fielder has continued to be a 
strong hitter since becoming vegetarian. But the important point is not that 
Fielder proved he could be both a good hitter and a vegetarian, but rather 
that the New York Times covered his switch to vegetarianism. Indeed, that 
the paper even considered Fielder‘s vegetarianism to be newsworthy is 
telling of the extent to which the relationship between meat and manhood 
is embedded in the fabric of our culture. 
In this Article, I use the relationship between meat and manhood as a 
springboard to challenge the way in which employment discrimination 
law—more specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act18—conceives of 
sex discrimination. The Article focuses in particular on what is perhaps the 
most transformative theory of sex discrimination—the gender-stereotyping 
theory of sex discrimination. The thrust of the gender-stereotyping theory 
is that an employer cannot discriminate against an employee for failing to 
conform to stereotypical gender expectations.
19
 The Supreme Court 
announced the theory in 1989, in the seminal case Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.
20
 In doing so, the Court ushered in a new wave of sex 
discrimination claims, shifting the focus of Title VII‘s sex discrimination 
 
 
 15. Alan Schwarz, Meat Is Out at Fielder’s Plate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.ny 
times.com/2008/04/27/sports/baseball/27fielder.html. 
 16. Id. Schwarz notes that Milwaukee is an especially meat-crazed city—with bratwurst reigning 
supreme—and that this love of meat permeates onto the ball field. According to Schwarz, during the 
sixth inning the Brewers stage the Sausage Race, ―a spirited race among five humans dressed as 
different varieties of wiener product, from Italian sausages to chorizo; a tofu dog has yet to be invited.‖ 
Id. 
 17. See CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FEMINIST-VEGETARIAN CRITICAL 
THEORY 13 (1998). 
 18. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)). 
 19. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (announcing the gender-
stereotyping theory); see also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) 
(discussing the gender-stereotyping theory at great length). 
 20. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/1
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project from formal sex segregation to more subtle forms of discrimination 
concerning how employees look and behave in the workplace.
21
  
The gender-stereotyping theory has begun to stumble in recent years, 
however. Courts have grown increasingly suspicious of gender-
stereotyping claims that they view as attempts to capture traits not 
protected under Title VII. The paradigm situation is discrimination against 
lesbian and gay employees. Courts uniformly agree that sexual orientation 
is not a protected trait under Title VII.
22
 Against this doctrinal backdrop, 
lesbian and gay employees have been bringing gender-stereotyping 
claims—as opposed to sexual orientation claims—as a means to combat 
the discrimination they face in the workplace. Yet courts have regularly 
rejected these claims, characterizing them as impermissible attempts to 
―bootstrap‖ protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.23 The theory 
behind this bootstrapping logic is that these gender-stereotyping claims are 
not sincere sex discrimination claims, but rather a kind of litigation sleight 
of hand, a way for employees to create statutory protection where no such 
protection exists.
24
 
 
 
 21. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1419–20 
(2008) (discussing the shift from status to conduct in discrimination); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (refocusing 
discrimination law on patterns of interactions within the workplace); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 170 
(2004) (discussing the shift from ―ontological‖ discrimination to ―trait‖ discrimination); see also KENJI 
YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 22 (2006) (describing the shift 
from first to second generation discrimination as ―progress: individuals no longer needed to be white, 
male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied; they needed only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, 
and able-bodied.‖) (emphasis in original). 
 22. See, e.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(―Title VII‘s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a person‘s sexuality.‖); Schroeder v. 
Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (―Title VII does not . . . provide for a private 
right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination.‖); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (―Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.‖); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (―Title VII does not prohibit 
harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.‖); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, 
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (―Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of 
sexual orientation.‖); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (―Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.‖). 
 23. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006); Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221–23 (2d Cir. 2005); Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 Fed. 
Appx. 48, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 
2003); Desantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330–31 (9th Cir. 1979). Many courts have 
likewise adopted this reasoning in the context of transgender discrimination. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–87 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
 24. My use of ―logic‖ is meant to correspond with Robert Post‘s use of that term, in his classic 
work Prejudicial Appearances. See ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF 
AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001). Like Post, I am seeking to challenge a particular logic 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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My goal in this Article is to show that this bootstrapping logic is faulty. 
The vehicle for critiquing it is a case study involving an ongoing lawsuit in 
which an employee has brought a discrimination claim against his former 
employer, alleging that the employer discriminated against him because he 
is vegetarian.
25
 The employee‘s claim has two dimensions. First, the 
employee charges that his supervisor taunted him because of his 
vegetarianism, calling him, among other things, a ―vegetarian homo.‖26 
Second, the employee alleges that the discrimination culminated in his 
being fired because of his vegetarianism.
27
 In general, the thrust of the 
employee‘s claim is that he faced discrimination because he failed to 
conform to the stereotype that ―real‖ men eat meat, putting him squarely 
within the confines of the gender-stereotyping theory.  
The male vegetarian case study is especially useful because it 
highlights the messiness of modern sex discrimination law in two ways: 
first, in terms of how employees experience discrimination; second, in 
terms of how courts analyze sex discrimination claims. The male 
vegetarian‘s case is particularly messy because it involves three 
overlapping identity traits—vegetarianism, sexual orientation, and gender 
nonconformity. While two of these traits are not protected under Title VII 
(vegetarianism and sexual orientation),
28
 the third—gender 
nonconformity—is not only protected under Title VII but also happens to 
be the basis for one of the most expansive theories of sex discrimination 
 
 
that is embedded in discrimination law, namely, that outsider plaintiffs use the gender-stereotyping 
theory to bootstrap protection for unprotected traits. Similarly, in her work on fat rights and weight-
based discrimination, Anna Kirkland builds on Post‘s work to develop a related understanding of the 
logics of discrimination. Kirkland uses what she calls the ―logics of personhood‖ to tease out the 
various ways in which discrimination law talks about difference and how difference matters in 
particular cases. See ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 2–
24 (2008). 
 25. See Jose Martinez, Wall Streeter Sues Employer over Vegetarian Taunts, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/01/29/2009-01-29_wall_streeter_sues_ 
employer_over_vegetar.html. 
 26. Complaint at 3–5, Pacifico v. Calyon in the Americas, No. 100992-2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 
26, 2009). 
 27. Id. at 7. 
 28. There is one context in which vegetarianism can almost serve as a protected trait, however. In 
the context of religious discrimination, vegetarian discrimination could give rise to an actionable 
discrimination claim, either because the employer failed to accommodate the employee‘s 
vegetarianism or because the employer based an employment decision on the employee‘s 
vegetarianism. In either situation, such a claim is possible because the courts define religion in terms 
of a status as well as a practice. Thus an employee‘s vegetarianism can be a part of an employee‘s 
religious practice, which means the practice is protected under Title VII. See, e.g., Van Koten v. 
Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 134 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 1998) (table) (involving an employee who, as a 
practicing Wiccian, alleged that he was discriminated against because of, among other things, his 
vegetarian diet). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/1
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available to employees under existing sex discrimination norms. Yet the 
male vegetarian will have a hard time convincing most courts that he faced 
discrimination because of sex and not because of either vegetarianism or 
sexual orientation, or some combination of the two. Faced with such a 
case, most courts would likely reject the case as bootstrapping simply 
because it involves unprotected traits. This Article proposes a more 
holistic approach to complex sex discrimination claims. The core of this 
new approach is that sometimes sex discrimination manifests as other 
forms of bias. In the male vegetarian‘s case, what may look like 
―vegetarian‖ or ―sexual orientation‖ discrimination is really ―sex‖ 
discrimination in the form of gender stereotyping. 
In terms of its broader contribution, then, this Article seeks to develop 
a theory of unprotected traits in employment discrimination law. The flaw 
of the bootstrapping logic is that it gives too much weight to unprotected 
traits in the discriminatory causation analysis, allowing unprotected traits 
to overwhelm the aspects of an employee‘s claim that are based on 
protected traits. My new framework would render unprotected traits 
neutral for purposes of proving a discrimination claim. By neutral, I mean 
that an unprotected trait should neither give rise to an actionable 
discrimination claim nor spoil an otherwise actionable claim. Underlying 
this framework is a principle of trait equality: just as all protected traits are 
similarly situated with respect to proving a discrimination claim under 
Title VII, no unprotected trait—whether vegetarianism, sexual orientation, 
or that the employee roots against the Chicago Bears
29—should be worse 
off than all other unprotected traits when it comes to proving a 
discrimination claim. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I puts my argument in context 
by situating the bootstrapping logic more broadly in Title VII case law and 
sketching the contours of Title VII‘s prohibition on discrimination 
―because of‖ sex. Part II turns to the male vegetarian case study. After 
providing an account of the employee‘s case, the centerpiece of this Part is 
an alternative reading of the employee‘s discrimination claim. This 
alternative reading is built around the idea that discrimination is not 
always as it seems. While the employee‘s case may look like vegetarian—
or even sexual orientation—discrimination, it is really a case of sex 
 
 
 29. The Chicago Tribune reported a story about a car salesman who was fired because he wore a 
Green Bay Packers tie to work the day after the Packers beat the Chicago Bears in the 2011 NFC 
Championship game. Dawn Rhodes & Ryan Haggerty, Packers Necktie Gets Car Salesman Fired, 
CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chibrknews-
packers-necktie-gets-car-sales-01242011,0,7415617.story. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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discrimination in the form of gender stereotyping. Part III develops a new 
theory of unprotected traits in employment discrimination law. The thrust 
of this new framework is that unprotected traits should be neutral for the 
purpose of proving an actionable discrimination claim. 
I. CONTEXT 
This Part seeks to put sex discrimination law in context. This 
discussion has two basic goals. The first is to outline the scope of Title 
VII‘s prohibition on discrimination ―because of‖ sex. Because the statute 
does not define ―sex,‖ the courts must determine the boundaries of this sex 
provision. And they have tended to interpret the provision narrowly, with 
the exception of the gender-stereotyping theory. The second goal is to 
develop an account of the bootstrapping logic. To that end, the discussion 
draws on the experiences of lesbian and gay employees who have sought 
to raise actionable gender-stereotyping claims, only to have those claims 
rejected on the grounds that sexual orientation is not protected under Title 
VII. Before turning to these issues, this Part opens with a brief discussion 
of the fundamentals of employment discrimination. 
A. The Fundamentals 
There are two central features of employment discrimination law. The 
first is that most traits are not protected under Title VII. American 
employment law is based on the at-will employment rule, in which 
employer and employee are equally free to terminate the employment 
relationship at any time and without cause.
30
 Title VII imposes a limit on 
the at-will rule by identifying five traits as prohibited bases for 
employment decisions—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.31 So 
long as they do not base an employment decision on one of these protected 
traits, employers are free to consider any other trait when making 
employment decisions. This is true of identity traits that are often quite 
salient in employment settings, such as an employee‘s socioeconomic 
 
 
 30. See Payne v. The W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). Payne marked the first time an 
American court adopted the at-will rule. According to the Payne court, employers ―may dismiss their 
employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, 
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.‖ Id. at 519–20. 
 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (―It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‖) (emphasis added). The sex 
provision is, of course, the most important for purposes of this Article. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/1
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status or physical appearance, as well as identity traits that rarely factor 
into employment decisions, such as eye color or shoe size. Because most 
traits are fair game for employers to consider, employment discrimination 
law is conceived as a remarkably narrow enterprise. 
The second feature of employment discrimination law—which works 
in conjunction with the first—is the discriminatory causation requirement. 
In order to state an actionable claim, an employee must prove that the 
alleged discrimination was ―because of‖ a protected trait and not ―because 
of‖ some other trait not protected under Title VII. For instance, say a male 
employee is passed over for a promotion in favor of a more qualified 
female candidate. To satisfy the causation requirement, the male employee 
must show that he was denied the promotion not because he was less 
qualified than the woman who ultimately secured the promotion, but rather 
because he is a man. In this sense, the discriminatory causation 
requirement provides a nexus between the challenged employment action 
(failure to promote) and the protected trait in question (sex).  
Yet the discrimination causation requirement is by its very nature an 
imprecise tool for identifying and remedying discrimination. With respect 
to the discriminatory causation requirement, employment discrimination 
law evaluates discrimination from the perspective of the discriminator 
rather than the victim of discrimination. Because few discriminators are 
careless enough to speak openly about their discriminatory motives,
32
 Title 
VII‘s discriminatory causation standard is designed to peer into the mind 
of the discriminator to determine if the discriminator took the challenged 
employment action ―because of‖ a protected trait. Ill-equipped to read a 
discriminator‘s mind, courts have instead developed a system of 
evidentiary frameworks that are designed to focus a court‘s inquiry into 
whether the employer took the challenged employment action ―because 
of‖ a protected trait.33 While they are no doubt helpful in ferreting out 
discrimination, these evidentiary frameworks are not foolproof. Thus, it is 
important to remember that without an explicit statement admitting 
 
 
 32. Cf. Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(involving a situation where the manager told an employee that it was ―time to show that a man could 
run the operation better‖); EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a 
situation where the employer actually said that ―the only people you will be seeing running the lines 
will be men; there will be no more women hired‖). 
 33. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (announcing a 
burden-shifting framework for considering evidence in disparate treatment cases); see also Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (concluding that plaintiffs do not have to raise direct 
evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction).  
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discriminatory intent, it is nearly impossible to know with certainty 
whether an employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination. 
B. The Boundaries of “Sex” 
Now consider the more specific matter of how courts have interpreted 
the scope of Title VII‘s ―sex‖ provision. The legislative history of Title 
VII‘s sex provision—more specifically, the absence of legislative 
history—looms large in sex discrimination jurisprudence.34 The 
conventional wisdom is that a few days before the House of 
Representatives was set to vote on the bill that would become the Civil 
Rights Act, Representative Howard Smith, the Chairman of the House 
Rules Committee and a staunch opponent of the Civil Rights Act, offered 
the sex amendment as a means to prevent the bill from coming to a vote.
35
 
Although Smith‘s attempt to kill the bill ultimately failed, the House did 
not have sufficient time to debate the substance of the sex provision, 
which means that courts have no substantive legislative history to guide 
them as they interpret this portion of the Act.
36
 As a result, courts tend to 
interpret the sex provision narrowly.
37
 It is worth noting that the 
conventional wisdom is not without its critics. In recent years, scholars 
have challenged the conventional wisdom as oversimplified and even 
historically inaccurate.
38
 Yet these critiques have fallen on deaf ears as 
 
 
 34. For a thorough account of the passage of the Civil Rights Act, see CHARLES WHALEN & 
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
(1985). 
 35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 11, 14 (3d ed. 2001). 
 36. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (relying on the 
legislative history of the ―sex‖ amendment in interpreting Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 
986–88 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ‘g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090–91 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (en banc) (same).  
 37. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976) (holding that Title VII‘s 
―sex‖ provision does not protect against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy). Congress 
responded to Gilbert by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII 
to protect female employees on the basis of pregnancy. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)); see also 
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–87 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing the lack of legislative history 
as a reason to exclude transgender employees from protection under Title VII); Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that judicial interpretation of the ―sex‖ 
provision is frustrated by its lack of positive legislative history). 
 38. See Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative 
History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997) 
(arguing that the ―sex‖ amendment was the product of complex political struggles involving the black 
civil rights movement and the women‘s rights movement); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake 
of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14–25 
(1995) (situating the ―sex‖ amendment in the larger sex equality movement). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/1
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courts have largely ignored these critiques in favor of the conventional 
view. 
1. Sex 
Title VII protects employees against discrimination in their capacity as 
men and women.
39
 This is a status protection, most often understood in 
terms of biology. The critical question in these sorts of disparate treatment 
cases is whether the employer took the challenged employment action 
solely because the employee happens to be male or female. For instance, 
consider the classic case of City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and 
Power v. Manhart.
40
 There, the Department administered its own system 
for retirement and disability benefits, rather than engage a private 
insurance company for the payment of benefits.
41
 Because women, on 
average, tend to live longer than men, the Department required female 
employees to make greater monthly contributions to its pension fund than 
male employees.
42
 And because monthly pension contributions were 
withheld from employees‘ paychecks, female employees took home less 
pay than their similarly situated male coworkers.
43
 The case made its way 
to the Supreme Court, where the Court rejected the Department‘s program 
on the grounds that it discriminated against individual female employees 
―because of‖ sex.44 According to the Court, the Department could not 
force an employee to make extra pension contributions solely because she 
was a woman.
45
 
The Manhart Court‘s view of sex turned on biological status. The only 
thing that mattered to the Department, for purposes of making pension 
contributions, was whether an employee was female or male. It did not 
matter whether the employee was sick or healthy, whether she herself had 
a long life expectancy, or whether she planned to stay with the Department 
until she retired. Because she was a woman, the Department required her 
 
 
 39. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (noting that Title VII 
prohibition on sex discrimination protects men as well as women) (citing Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)). 
 40. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 41. Id. at 704–05. 
 42. Id. at 705 (―The cost of a pension for the average retired female is greater than for the 
average male retiree because more monthly payments must be made to the average woman. The 
Department therefore required female employees to make monthly contributions to the fund which 
were 14.84% higher than the contributions required of comparable male employees.‖).  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 710–11. 
 45. Id. 
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to make more payments into the system than a similarly situated man 
would have to make. Employment discrimination scholars often refer to 
these types of claims as either status discrimination or first generation sex 
discrimination claims.
46
 
2. Gender 
Title VII‘s prohibition against sex discrimination extends beyond 
biological status to protect against discrimination targeted at an 
employee‘s gender. Whereas ―sex‖ refers to an employee‘s biological 
status, ―gender‖ in this usage refers to cultural expressions of masculinity 
and femininity. The protection against gender discrimination dates back to 
the Supreme Court‘s groundbreaking opinion in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.
47
 In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was denied partnership 
despite having accumulated an impressive work record in her five years 
with the firm.
48
 Although the feedback relating to Hopkins‘s work 
performance was uniformly strong,
49
 the reviews of her ―interpersonal 
skills‖ were less than glowing.50 Some of the partners described Hopkins 
as overly aggressive and abrasive, and there was a concern that she treated 
the support staff disrespectfully.
51
 Yet many of the partners‘ reviews 
smacked of gender bias.
52
 One partner described Hopkins as ―macho,‖53 
while another suggested she should take ―a course at charm school,‖54 and 
yet another said that she ―overcompensated for being a woman.‖55 The 
most egregious comment, however, came from Hopkins‘s mentor at the 
firm, who had the unfortunate task of informing Hopkins of the partners‘ 
 
 
 46. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1419–23 
(2008); see also Yuracko, supra note 21, at 169–70 (2004) (referring to status discrimination as 
―ontological‖ discrimination); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001). 
 47. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 48. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233–34 (1989). 
 49. For instance, the partners in Hopkins‘s office issued a joint statement, describing her as ―‗an 
outstanding professional‘ who had a ‗deft touch,‘ a ‗strong character, independence and integrity.‘‖ Id. 
at 234. In particular, they cited the two years of work she did to secure a $25 million contract with the 
Department of State, calling it ―an outstanding performance,‖ which she did ―virtually at the partner 
level.‖ Id. at 233. 
 50. According to the Court, ―Virtually all of the partners‘ negative remarks about Hopkins—even 
those of partners supporting her—had to do with her ‗interpersonal skills.‘‖). Id. at 234–35. 
 51. Id. at 234. 
 52. Id. at 235 (―There were clear signs . . . that some of the partners reacted negatively to 
Hopkins‘ personality because she was a woman.‖). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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decision.
56
 Advising Hopkins as to how she could improve her chances for 
partnership in the future, he said she should ―walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.‖57  
Hopkins responded by suing Price Waterhouse under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.
58
 The thrust of Hopkins‘s claim was that the firm 
allowed gender stereotyping to seep into—and ultimately cloud—its 
review of her partnership application. A novel claim for its time, Hopkins 
argued that she lost her partnership bid not because she was a woman, but 
because she engaged in behavior that the firm‘s partners did not think was 
appropriately feminine. Endorsing this more nuanced kind of sex 
discrimination claim, the Supreme Court concluded, ―an employer who 
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she 
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.‖59 More generally, the Court 
held that an employer violates Title VII‘s prohibition against sex 
discrimination if the employer penalizes employees for failing to conform 
to stereotypical gender expectations about how men and women are 
supposed to present themselves in the workplace. As the Court put it, ―we 
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group.‖60 
In terms of its mechanics, a gender-stereotyping claim unfolds in three 
steps. The first is what I call the employee‘s ―anchor gender.‖ A person‘s 
anchor gender consists of the gender expectation commonly associated 
with the person‘s sex. For instance, a man‘s anchor gender is masculinity, 
whereas a woman‘s anchor gender is femininity. In terms of the broader 
implications of the theory, anchor gender corresponds with the employer‘s 
stereotypical gender expectations. The second step of the gender-
stereotyping claim is what I call ―expressive gender.‖ Whereas the anchor 
gender tracks cultural stereotypes about men and women, expressive 
gender refers to the employee‘s idiosyncratic gender expression–that is, 
the gender expression the employee actually performs in the workplace. 
 
 
 56. Id. In her book, Hopkins describes herself as the ―most ardent admirer‖ of her mentor, Tom 
Beyer. See ANN BRANIGAR HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY 118 (1996). 
Elsewhere in the book she says this of Beyer‘s advice: ―For more than three years I had worked almost 
exclusively for Tom. I knew him very well. If it got results, he could have cared less if a consultant 
attended a business meeting in Bermudas and tennis shoes. Tom‘s counsel was nonsense.‖ Id. at 148. 
 57. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 58. Id. at 232. 
 59. Id. at 250. 
 60. Id. at 251. 
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The expressive gender component of the theory establishes the employee‘s 
gender variance. The third and final step in the theory concerns the 
discriminatory relationship. In order to state an actionable gender-
stereotyping claim, the employee must demonstrate that the employer took 
the challenged employment action because the employee‘s expressive 
gender did not correspond with the claimant‘s anchor gender. 
As the original gender-stereotyping claimant, Ann Hopkins provides 
perhaps the best example of how the gender-stereotyping theory works in 
action. The first step is the easiest: because Hopkins was a woman, her 
anchor gender was femininity.
61
 We can also glean from the partners‘ 
comments about Hopkins‘s behavior and appearance that Price 
Waterhouse expected its female employees to conform to a feminine 
standard by wearing makeup, styling their hair, and dressing femininely, 
as well as being polite, quiet, and passive in their interactions with 
colleagues.
62
 Hopkins‘s expressive gender, by contrast, fell on the more 
masculine side of the gender spectrum. She did not dress or look the part, 
nor did she shy away from confrontation. The last step in the analysis 
concerns the discriminatory relationship. Because Price Waterhouse based 
its partnership decision on the discrepancy between Hopkins‘s anchor 
gender (femininity) and expressive gender (masculinity), they 
discriminated against her ―because of‖ her sex, in violation of Title VII.63 
The critical inquiry in gender-stereotyping cases is whether the 
employer has penalized the employee for not living up to the employer‘s 
stereotypical gender expectations. Thus the gender-stereotyping theory 
pits the discrimination claimant against a hypothetical male or female, a 
heuristic rather than an actual person.
64
 As a result, the name of the game 
for employees in gender-stereotyping cases is to paint a clear picture of 
both the employer‘s gender expectations and the specific ways in which 
the employee departs from these expectations. The downside to this 
 
 
 61. Of course, it is also possible to imagine a case where a female employee‘s anchor gender is 
masculinity rather than femininity, though I am not aware of such a case. For instance, imagine a 
workplace where gender nonconformity is the norm for female employees. In such a situation, a 
female employee‘s anchor gender would be masculinity, and she would have to express femininity in 
order to state an actionable claim. Thus the important point is that the anchor gender concept—as well 
as the whole gender-stereotyping enterprise—is largely driven by the norms of a particular workplace. 
Many thanks to Chris Whytock for his thoughts on this point. 
 62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 63. Id. at 237. 
 64. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 779–91 
(2011) (discussing how gender-stereotyping analysis does not require a claimant to provide 
comparative evidence of how the employer treated an actual employee). 
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analysis, however, is that the theory tends to reify the most extreme 
stereotypes about men and women.
65
 
3. Beyond the Boundary: Sexual Orientation 
Unlike sex and gender, courts have been unwilling to extend Title VII‘s 
sex provision to reach discrimination claims based on sexual orientation.
66
 
In general, courts have concluded that because Congress did not have 
sexual orientation in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the 
only way to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination is to pass a new 
statute either as an amendment to Title VII or as a stand-alone bill.
67
 Since 
the 1970s, Congress has regularly considered various bills that would 
expand federal law to cover discrimination based on sexual orientation.
68
 
The current version of this proposed legislation is the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).
69
 If enacted, ENDA would substantially alter 
the landscape of employment discrimination law, as it would provide a 
remedy for employees who face discrimination because of their sexual 
orientation. In the meantime, lesbian and gay employees are limited to 
relief under applicable state and local antidiscrimination statutes.
70
 
 
 
 65. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009). The plaintiff in 
Prowel alleged that he was harassed by his coworkers because he failed to conform to the stereotypical 
vision of manhood that permeated his workplace, which he described as follows:  
[B]lue jeans, t-shirt, blue collar worker, very rough around the edges. Most of the guys there 
hunted. Most of the guys there fished. If they drank, they drank beer, they didn‘t drink gin 
and tonic. Just you know, all into football, sports, all that kind of stuff, everything I wasn‘t. 
Id. at 287. In earlier work, Liz Glazer and I argue that this is also potentially problematic for 
transgender employees, as the theory often requires them to self-identify as a sex that conflicts with 
their sense of self. See Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651 (2009). 
 66. This discussion does not focus on the transgender cases in large part because transgender 
employees, though not uniformly successful, have had more success than lesbian and gay employees 
in pursuing remedies under Title VII‘s sex provision. See Glazer & Kramer, supra note 65, at 656–58 
(highlighting the successes of transgender employees). This lends support to Professor Taylor Flynn‘s 
thesis, in an influential essay, that the transgender cases will transform sex discrimination 
jurisprudence for the benefit of lesbian and gay employees. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the 
Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation 
Equality, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001). 
 67. The model, in this respect, is the Americans with Disabilities Act, which was put forth as a 
stand-alone law rather than as an amendment to Title VII. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006). 
 68. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING 
CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 149–87 (John D‘Emilio et al. eds., 2000) 
(documenting the history of ENDA and its predecessors). 
 69. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 811/H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 70. According to a recent study from the Williams Institute, an academic think tank on sexual 
orientation law and public policy, twenty-one states, plus the District of Columbia, prohibit 
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C. Bootstrapping 
Within this doctrinal landscape, lesbian and gay employees have 
sought to raise sex discrimination claims under Title VII in the form of 
gender-stereotyping cases. The thrust of these cases is that the employees 
faced discrimination in their capacity not as gay people, but as gender-
nonconforming men and women. These are, at their core, sex 
discrimination cases, premised on the idea that the plaintiffs faced 
discrimination because they failed to conform to their employers‘ 
expectations of how men and women are supposed to look and act. Yet the 
courts have viewed these cases in a very different light. Courts 
consistently reject gender-stereotyping claims brought by lesbian and gay 
employees on grounds that sexual orientation is not a protected trait under 
Title VII.
71
 Rather than sincere sex discrimination claims, courts view 
these cases as nothing more than attempts to bootstrap protection for 
sexual orientation into Title VII. 
Dawn Dawson‘s case provides a perfect example.72 Dawson worked as 
a hair assistant and stylist trainee at Bumble & Bumble, a high-end salon 
in New York City.
73
 Bumble & Bumble ―strives for the avant garde and 
extols the unconventional,‖74 encouraging its employees to experiment 
with their style.
75
 Yet Dawson stood out among the eclectic staff.
76
 Her 
 
 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia). See THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, Analysis of Scope and 
Enforcement of State Laws and Executive Orders Prohibiting Employment Discrimination Against 
LGBT People, in DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY IN STATE EMPLOYMENT 15–10 (2009). Only twelve states, plus the District of 
Columbia, prohibit transgender discrimination, as well. Id. Many more municipalities prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination.  
 71. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Dawson v. Bumble & 
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221–23 (2d Cir. 2005) (Dawson II); Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 Fed. 
Appx. 48 (3d Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003); Desantis 
v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330–31 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 72. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (Dawson II). 
 73. Id. at 213. 
 74. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 246 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Dawson I). 
 75. Id. at 310. 
 76. The District Court made much of the diverse cast of characters that made up Bumble & 
Bumble‘s workforce, noting that the salon‘s employees ―embody many lifestyles and sexual 
preferences and reflect varying physical appearances, overall looks, and different manners of hair dress 
and clothing.‖ Id. During her tenure at the salon, Dawson‘s coworkers included many lesbians and gay 
men, a bisexual person, a female-to-male transsexual person, and a pre-operative male-to-female 
transsexual person who was transitioning on the job at the time of the relevant events. Dawson II, 398 
F.3d at 214. 
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coworkers teased her regularly during her almost two years at the salon. 
They said that she ―[wore] her sexuality like a costume‖77 and that she 
―needed to have sex with a man.‖78 They called her ―Donald‖ in front of 
clients.
79
 And they suggested that she should act more like a woman and 
less like a man.
80
 Ultimately, Dawson was fired as a hair assistant and 
removed from the stylist training program.
81
 When Dawson‘s supervisor 
told her of this news, the supervisor said that Dawson would never get a 
stylist position outside New York City because her appearance and 
demeanor would frighten people.
82
 
Dawson brought a sex discrimination claim against Bumble & Bumble, 
alleging that she was harassed and terminated from the training program 
because she was a ―lesbian female, who does not conform to gender norms 
in that she does not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity and may 
be perceived as more masculine than a stereotypical woman.‖83 She 
alleged that her ―overall appearance is more like a male than a female‖84 
and that ―many people think that I look less like a female and more like a 
male.‖85 To flesh out her claim, Dawson alleged, ―her outward appearance 
does not conform to the traditional expectations of the way a woman 
would look,‖ citing her clothes (leather pants and jean jacket), her haircut 
(a mohawk), and her lack of feminine jewelry, perfume, and makeup.
86
 
Dawson made no attempt to hide her sexuality during the litigation, and 
that decision ultimately proved fatal to her case.
87
 Rejecting her claim, the 
court held that the discriminatory comments were directed at Dawson‘s 
homosexuality rather than her gender nonconformity.
88
 As such, she could 
 
 
 77. Id. at 215. 
 78. Id. One coworker said this in even more graphic terms: ―You know, what you need, Dawn, 
you need to get fucked.‖ Dawson I, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
 79. Dawson II, 398 F.3d at 215. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 214. 
 82. Id. at 215–16. 
 83. Id. at 213. 
 84. Id. at 221. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. In a section titled, ―Don‘t Plead It Unless You Need It,‖ a litigation manual about 
representing sexual minorities in discrimination cases advises, ―When bringing a gender stereotyping 
claim under Title VII, it is almost never a good idea to affirmatively plead or introduce evidence of a 
plaintiffs‘ [sic] sexual orientation. It does not help the case and can seriously damage it.‖ Justin M. 
Swartz et al., Nine Tips for Representing LGBT Employees in Discrimination Cases, 759 PRACTICING 
L. INST.: LITIG. 95, 103 (2007).  
 88. Dawson II, 398 F.3d. at 217–20. 
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not state an actionable claim under Title VII.
89
 The court did not stop 
there, however. Addressing the bootstrapping logic head on, the court 
explained that gender-stereotyping claims brought by ―avowedly 
homosexual plaintiff[s]‖ raise problems for adjudicators because 
―[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will 
often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and 
homosexuality.‖90 To emphasize the point, the court added, ―a gender 
stereotyping claim should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual 
orientation into Title VII.‖91 
Although the court is right that the line separating gender norms and 
sexual orientation is at best blurry, the court‘s response to this blurriness is 
problematic. The bootstrapping logic dodges the substance of the 
employee‘s claim by adopting a zero tolerance approach: if a claim makes 
any mention of homosexuality, then it is a sexual orientation claim and 
must fail.
92
 And because the cultural stigma attached to homosexuality is 
so overwhelming, the deck is stacked against lesbian and gay employees 
who seek to raise gender-stereotyping claims, as courts tend to view their 
sex discrimination claims through the lens of homosexuality.
93
  
For courts that view gender-stereotyping claims by lesbian and gay 
plaintiffs as a bootstrapping tactic, homosexuality is operating as what 
sociologists call a ―master status.‖ A master status is a stigmatized trait 
that tends to overshadow all other aspects of a person‘s identity.94 Once a 
court identifies an employee as gay or lesbian, the court makes itself 
hyperaware of the employee‘s homosexuality, thereby enabling the 
employee‘s homosexuality to swallow all other aspects of the employee‘s 
identity. We see this in Dawn Dawson‘s case when the court talks about 
 
 
 89. Id. at 217–18 (holding that ―to the extent she is alleging discrimination based upon her 
lesbianism, Dawson cannot satisfy the first element of a prima facie case under Title VII‖). 
 90. Id. at 218 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
 91. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 92. This zero-tolerance approach is reminiscent of the so-called ―one-drop‖ rule in the old racial 
classification cases. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1737 
(1993). For example, Homer Plessy, the plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson, was one-eighth black and 
seven-eighths white. Thus, under Louisiana‘s blood quantum law at the time, Plessy was deemed to be 
a Black person and therefore subject to the railroad‘s rule about segregated railcars. See Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
 93. As I have argued in earlier work, this is not a concern for heterosexual employees, as courts 
never view their gender-stereotyping claims through the lens of heterosexuality. Zachary A. Kramer, 
Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205 (2009). 
 94. See WAYNE H. BREKHUS: PEACOCKS, CHAMELEONS, CENTAURS: GAY SUBURBIA AND THE 
GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 11 (2003); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, 
and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 819–20 (2004); Stephen C. Ainlay et al., Stigma 
Reconsidered, in THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEW OF STIGMA 1, 6 
(Stephen C. Ainlay et al. eds., 1986). 
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the difficulty that arises when ―avowedly homosexual‖ employees raise 
gender-stereotyping claims.
95
 The court is, in effect, marking lesbian and 
gay employees as ―homosexuals.‖ Once the employees are ascribed with 
the homosexual master status,
96
 the court cannot help but view their 
gender-stereotyping claims through the lens of their homosexuality. Thus 
the court automatically leaps to the conclusion that the employees are 
trying bootstrap protection for sexual orientation. My goal in the 
remainder of the Article is to develop an alternative approach to these 
complex gender-stereotyping claims. 
II. OF MEAT AND MANHOOD 
Although most pronounced in the lesbian and gay cases, the 
bootstrapping logic is a feature of employment discrimination law 
generally. After all, the key ingredient of the bootstrapping logic is an 
unprotected trait, which need not always be sexual orientation. My goal in 
this Part is to critique the bootstrapping logic in a fresh light as a means to 
show why employment discrimination law needs to develop a new 
approach to dealing with unprotected traits. The centerpiece of this 
critique is a case study involving a male plaintiff who has brought a 
discrimination claim against his former employer. The case rests on a 
theory of vegetarian discrimination. As we will see, however, the 
employee‘s claim is actually more nuanced than that, involving the 
interplay of three interconnected traits (sex, vegetarianism, and sexual 
orientation), two of which are not protected under existing employment 
discrimination norms (vegetarianism and sexual orientation). 
A. The Male Vegetarian 
Ryan Pacifico worked as a trader for Calyon in the Americas, a 
subsidiary of the French firm Credit Agricole, one of the largest retail 
banking groups in the world.
97
 Pacifico worked at Calyon for less than 
 
 
 95. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 96. This is a product of the relational nature of social interactions, as developed by the work of 
sociologist Erving Goffman. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(1959) (comparing interpersonal relations to a theatrical performance); ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: 
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2–5 (1963) (developing a relational account of 
stigmatized social identities). Though it was published some time ago, Goffman‘s work on stigma 
remains the authoritative account of the subject of stigma and social identity. 
 97. Complaint at 1, Pacifico v. Calyon in the Americas, No. 100992-2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 
2009). 
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three years.
98
 Though things started out great for Pacifico at Calyon,
99
 his 
job took a turn for the worse when his supervisor, Robert Catalanello, 
learned that Pacifico was a vegetarian. From then on Catalanello subjected 
Pacifico to a steady barrage of taunts, insults, and demeaning antics. The 
bulk of the harassment aimed to belittle Pacifico by equating 
vegetarianism with homosexuality. He called Pacifico ―gay,‖100 ―homo,‖101 
and ―vegetarian homo.‖102 He scheduled business meals at steakhouses 
and burger joints so Pacifico would not be able to eat anything.
103
 When a 
concerned coworker inquired as to what Pacifico would eat at a 
steakhouse, Catalanello said, ―Who the fuck cares? It‘s his fault for being 
a vegetarian homo.‖104 And during a later conversation about steakhouses, 
Catalanello mocked Pacifico, saying ―You don‘t even eat steak dude. At 
what point in time did you realize you were gay?‖105  
Catalanello also picked on Pacifico because of his athleticism. While 
Pacifico was showing his coworkers a picture of himself participating in a 
triathlon, Catalanello approached the crowd, pointed at the picture and 
said, ―That‘s you? Those are some pretty gay tights. Figures you‘d like 
them.‖106 Upon noticing a triathlon magazine on Pacifico‘s desk, 
Catalanello said to the other traders, ―Look everybody, Ryan brought in 
his homo magazine again for everyone to see.‖107 There were also times 
when Catalanello belittled Pacifico‘s work performance in front of the 
entire staff.
108
 On one particular occasion, when Pacifico hesitated before 
setting a price for a large trade of rare currency, Catalanello said, ―Get a 
set of balls and make a price. Don‘t always be such a homo.‖109 
Pacifico‘s tenure at Calyon ended abruptly. After calling in sick one 
day, an employee from Calyon‘s human resources department called 
 
 
 98. Id. at 2, 7. 
 99. Id. at 2 (alleging that Pacifico ―received satisfactory scores on all of his employment 
evaluations‖ and ―he always met and exceeded his trading goals‖). 
 100. Id. at 4. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 4–5. Preparing for a celebration lunch for the traders, Catalanello said, ―I‘m only 
ordering burgers. If you don‘t eat meat, too bad. I don‘t care.‖ Id. at 5. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. Id. at 5. 
 106. Id. at 3. 
 107. Id. at 5. 
 108. See id. at 6 (involving a situation where Catalanello yelled at Pacifico after he traded for a 
loss). Pacifico contends that, in this situation, he followed the industry standard and the loss was out of 
his control because the currency went up after he conducted the sale. 
 109. Id. at 5. 
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Pacifico to fire him.
110
 The stated reason for the termination was that 
Pacifico failed to increase risk in his trades and to cooperate with 
management‘s orders.111 
B. The Claim 
Pacifico filed a discrimination claim against Calyon, alleging that he 
was harassed and ultimately fired because he is vegetarian and because he 
was perceived to be gay.
112
 Rather than seek redress under Title VII, 
Pacifico sued under New York‘s state and municipal human rights laws.113 
This was a strategic decision. Unlike Title VII, New York law protects 
employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
114
 The 
specific nature of Pacifico‘s claim is that he faced discrimination not 
because he is actually gay, but rather because his coworkers wrongly 
perceived him to be gay.
115
 As a news account of the case notes, Pacifico 
is in fact heterosexual and married, and he and his wife served steak at 
their wedding in 2010.
116
 
My interest in Pacifico‘s case has less to do with the particulars of his 
state law claim—which appears strong on its face—than with the broader 
implications of the discrimination he faced in the workplace and why it 
poses a fundamental challenge to existing sex discrimination norms. On a 
doctrinal level, there is a clear strategic advantage in framing Pacifico‘s 
claim as one of sexual orientation discrimination, for doing so enables 
Pacifico to raise an actionable discrimination claim under state law. But 
there is a larger phenomenon at work in Pacifico‘s case, which Pacifico‘s 
lawyer captured well when he said the following to a reporter: ―They 
associated being a vegetarian with being gay. It‘s a ridiculous male 
stereotype that only real men eat meat.‖117 Pacifico‘s case is as much about 
gender stereotyping as it is about sexual orientation discrimination, if not 
more so. As I argue below, vegetarianism and sexual orientation merely 
served as proxies for the real reason Catalanello and others discriminated 
 
 
 110. Id. at 7. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296; N.Y.C. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8. 
 114. N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 15, § 296(1); N.Y.C. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, § 8-107(1)(a)–(d). 
 115. Complaint at 8, Pacifico v. Calyon in the Americas, No. 100992-2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 
2009). 
 116. Martinez, supra note 25. 
 117. Id. 
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against Pacifico—he failed to conform to their idea of how a ―real‖ man is 
supposed to look and act. 
C. Rereading the Claim 
This part offers an alternative reading of Pacifico‘s case. This reading 
is built around the idea that sex discrimination—indeed, all types of 
invidious discrimination—often manifest as other forms of discrimination. 
Sometimes a discriminator says one thing and means another thing. In the 
case of gender-stereotyping claims, a discriminator may target an 
employee‘s status not because of the status itself, but rather because of the 
gender norms associated with such a status. In such a situation, the 
employee‘s status acts as a proxy for gender stereotyping. Ryan Pacifico‘s 
case provides a useful illustration of how this process plays out in practice. 
While it may look like sexual orientation or vegetarianism discrimination, 
the discrimination faced by Pacifico is really sex discrimination in the 
form of gender stereotyping.  
This discussion proceeds in two parts. The first part focuses on the 
relationship between manliness and meat eating. It argues that Catalanello 
viewed Pacifico‘s vegetarianism as a proxy for effeminacy. The second 
part focuses on the relationship between food and cultural attitudes about 
homosexuality. It is not a coincidence that ―fruit‖ is a common antigay 
slur used to demean gay men,
118
 nor is it a coincidence that Catalanello 
started to harass Pacifico as soon as he learned that Pacifico was 
vegetarian. For Catalanello, the easiest way to belittle Pacifico—and 
perhaps the most harmful way do so in their particular workplace setting—
was to call him gay. By doing so, Catalanello was relying on the 
stereotype, which is deeply rooted in our culture, that gay men are 
―fairies‖ and ―sissies‖ and altogether not manly men.119  
 
 
 118. See Patrick McGann, Eating Muscle: Material-Semiotics and a Manly Appetite, in 
REVEALING MALE BODIES 88, 83–99 (Nancy Tuana et al. eds. 2002); see also Buerkle, supra note 12, 
at 82 (noting McGann‘s discussion of ―fruit‖ as a homophobic slur). 
 119. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 22–23 
(1988) (discussing the stereotype of gay men as ―fairies‖ and ―sissies‖); Samuel A. Marcosson, 
Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 
GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (referring to the ―ultimate‖ gender stereotype that gay men are by definition 
effeminate); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
passim (1995).  
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1. Meat and Manliness 
Pacifico worked on Wall Street, a stronghold of machismo culture, and 
Pacifico‘s firm seemed to fit that mold. On numerous occasions the firm‘s 
masculine culture revealed itself in conversations about where and what to 
eat. For instance, Catalanello frequently rewarded his team with food, 
either by taking them to eat at a steakhouse
120
 or by ordering in lunch.
121
 
Knowing full well that Pacifico was vegetarian, Catalanello purposely 
sought to punish Pacifico by refusing to order anything but meat for work-
related meals: ―I‘m only ordering burgers. If you don‘t eat meat, too bad. I 
don‘t care.‖122 
Catalanello‘s attitude about Pacifico‘s vegetarianism—that is, his 
animosity toward Pacifico‘s vegetarianism—is rooted in a gender 
stereotype about manliness. Meat eating is closely connected to 
manliness.
123
 As philosopher Michael Allen Fox writes, ―Meat is 
masculine food, powerful food; to be a ‗real man‘ in our culture is to eat 
meat—lots of it, and the redder the better.‖124 Because we associate meat 
with manhood, vegetarian men transgress a gender boundary that is 
tethered to notions of men‘s food and women‘s food. And because they 
forego what our culture deems to be men‘s food, vegetarian men are seen 
as weak and insufficiently masculine.
125
 In fact, gender bias toward 
vegetarian men is closely related to, and often bleeds into, bias directed at 
women and gay men.
126
  
The work of Carol Adams, a prolific feminist scholar, bears on this 
point. In her classic book, The Sexual Politics of Meat,
127
 Adams develops 
what she calls a ―feminist-vegetarian critical theory.‖128 For Adams, there 
is a strong connection between meat eating, which she views in terms of 
species oppression, and the subjugation of women.
129
 According to 
 
 
 120. Complaint at 4–5, Pacifico v. Calyon in the Americas, No. 100992-2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 
26, 2009). 
 121. Id. at 5. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Sobal, supra note 12, at 137 (―Animal flesh is a consummate male food, and a man eating 
meat is an exemplar of maleness.‖). 
 124. MICHAEL ALLEN FOX, DEEP VEGETARIANISM 27 (1999). 
 125. See Buerkle, supra note 12, at 81–83. 
 126. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 44–49 (discussing the links between meat and patriarchy); 
Sobal, supra note 12, at 141 (―Vegetarianism provides an identity that transgresses masculinity in 
Western societies, with the wholesale rejection of the male icon of meat-eater associated with 
women‘s, wimpy, or even gay identities.‖). 
 127. ADAMS, supra note 12. 
 128. Id. at 166–68. 
 129. Id. at 13–14. 
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Adams, ―[m]eat eating is an integral part of male dominance; 
vegetarianism acts as a sign of dis-ease with patriarchal culture.‖130 
Because they choose to eat women‘s food instead of men‘s food, 
vegetarian men effectively shed their privilege as masculine men.
131
 In 
doing so, vegetarian men expose themselves to the scorn of those for 
whom meat eating is a critical marker of masculinity. By refusing to eat 
meat, Adams argues, ―a man is effeminate, a ‗sissy,‘ a ‗fruit.‘‖132 
We can see this dynamic at work in Pacifico‘s case. Catalanello picked 
on Pacifico because he thought that Pacifico did not eat what a ―real‖ man 
is supposed to eat. According to Catalanello‘s worldview, a man is 
expected to be masculine and one way in which he should express his 
masculinity is by eating meat. Catalanello targeted Pacifico because he did 
not live up to this standard. To put this in terms of a discriminatory 
causation analysis, Catalanello harassed Pacifico not because Pacifico is 
vegetarian, but because Pacifico was not sufficiently masculine. The key 
here is that vegetarianism acts a proxy for effeminacy. While there is no 
question that the case may look like vegetarian status discrimination, the 
real culprit is a pernicious stereotype about men who do not eat meat. 
2. Fruits 
There is more to the story, however. Antigay slurs and putdowns also 
played a significant role in harassment suffered by Pacifico. True, the 
words ―gay‖ and ―homo‖ are not intrinsically harmful labels. But in the 
context in which Catalanello used these words, he certainly meant it to 
demean Pacifico. And it is telling that Catalanello used food as a 
springboard to attack Pacifico‘s manliness, as food often serves as a 
powerful metaphor for our cultural attitudes about manliness and 
sexuality.  
In his work on the morality of gay rights, philosopher Richard Mohr 
demonstrates that gendered and homophobic slurs are often rooted in 
stereotypes about food.
133
 According to Mohr, slurs like ―fruit‖ demean 
gay men not only by associating them with the low status of women in our 
society,
134
 but also by suggesting that gay men ―have betrayed their 
 
 
 130. Id. at 167. 
 131. Id. at 38 (―Men who become vegetarians challenge an essential part of the masculine role.‖). 
 132. Id. 
 133. RICHARD D. MOHR, THE LONG ARC OF JUSTICE: LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, EQUALITY, 
AND RIGHTS 78–82 (2005). 
 134. Id. at 79. According to Mohr, ―Women are chiefly referred to in slurs by designations of 
animal species (bitch, beaver, cow, fish, vixen, pussy, shrew), by terms which assimilate women to 
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socially assigned gender-status.‖135 To support his case, Mohr contrasts the 
image of the ―real‖ man, who is by his very nature heterosexual, with that 
of gay men.
136
 Of ―real‖ men, Mohr writes, ―Their antipode down at the 
bottom of the human heap is vegetable existence—pansies, fruits, and the 
physically challenged, who, like gay men, also are typically denoted and 
demoted with vegetative slurs.‖137 And vegetative slurs are powerful, 
Mohr argues, because ―vegetables don‘t do anything.‖138 Mohr‘s point 
takes on a whole new meaning when we consider the emergence of the 
new ―caveman diet,‖ whose adherents eschew fruits and vegetables in 
favor of copious amounts of meat and vigorous exercise in an attempt to 
replicate the dietary and living habits of prehistoric man.
139
 
Catalanello did not actually have to call Pacifico a ―fruit‖ in order to 
challenge his manhood. By taking aim at Pacifico‘s dietary preferences, 
Catalanello was engaging in a familiar practice by which heterosexual men 
try to make other heterosexual men seem insufficiently masculine.
140
 In 
her book Dude, You’re A Fag, sociologist C.J. Pascoe documents the ways 
in which high school-aged boys construct their masculinity through the 
use of hyper-sexualized idioms.
141
 According to Pascoe, ―Boys lay claim 
to masculine identities by lobbing homophobic epithets at one another.‖142 
Pascoe‘s research demonstrates that words like ―fag‖ or ―homo‖ often 
have more to do with gender than sexual orientation. She cites one boy as 
saying, of the word ―fag,‖ ―It doesn‘t even have anything to do with being 
gay.‖143 In fact, one of the students Pascoe interviewed told her that 
although he and his friends use the word ―fag‖ liberally, they would not 
 
 
immature animals and children (chick, doll, babe, baby, girl), or which reduce women to the body 
parts by which their animality differs from that of males (cunt, gash, beaver, pussy, bag, muff, rack). 
Note that there are no corresponding derogatory terms for males in contemporary culture.‖ Id. at 81. 
Mohr‘s point, though well taken, is overstated. After all, we certainly use animalistic terms to describe 
men. For instance, both ―stud‖ and ―hoss‖ are terms used to describe horses as well as manly men. But 
the difference is that these terms are generally used as positive descriptions of men, whereas the 
animalistic terms for women are uniformly derogatory in nature. 
 135. Id. at 79. 
 136. Id. at 79–81. 
 137. Id. at 81 (emphasis in original). 
 138. Id.  
 139. See Joseph Goldstein, The New Age Caveman and the City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at ST 
1. 
 140. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 448–
50 (2000); see also Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the Rule of Law, 
29 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 37–40 (2010). 
 141. C.J. PASCOE, DUDE, YOU‘RE A FAG: MASCULINITY AND SEXUALITY IN HIGH SCHOOL (2007). 
 142. Id. at 5. 
 143. Id. at 57. 
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direct it at a homosexual peer.
144
 Pascoe argues, instead, that the boys are 
using these slurs to assert their own gender dominance: ―The lack of 
masculinity is the problem, not the sexual practice or orientation.‖145  
Nor should we dismiss this behavior as something only young boys do 
to one another. In her work on sexual harassment law, Vicki Schultz 
discusses the prevalence of antigay sentiments in cases of male-on-male 
sexual harassment.
146
 According to Schultz, ―Because many heterosexual 
men regard any failure to conform to their own preconceived notion of 
masculinity as a sign of homosexuality—and homosexuality as a failure to 
conform to their preconceived notion of masculinity—such harassment 
frequently includes antigay sentiments.‖147 This is precisely what is going 
on in Pacifico‘s case. There is nothing to suggest that Catalanello—or 
others at the firm—actually thought Pacifico was gay. After all, Pacifico 
married his wife during his time at the firm, and there is no allegation that 
he tried to hide his wedding or, for that matter, his heterosexuality from 
his coworkers. Instead, Catalanello called Pacifico ―gay‖ and ―homo‖ 
because this is an easy and, unfortunately, all too common way for one 
heterosexual man to call into question another heterosexual‘s man 
masculinity. For Catalanello, sexual orientation—specifically, 
homosexuality—is acting as a proxy for what is really going on in 
Pacifico‘s case: sex discrimination, in the form of gender stereotyping. 
Catalanello thought Pacifico was less of a man because of his 
vegetarianism, so he treated him as though he were gay.
148
  
 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 59. 
 146. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1774–89 
(1998). 
 147. Id. at 1776–77; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 148. There is a robust literature on lesbian and gay men as gender transgressors. See Marc A. 
Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal 
Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992); Sylvia A. Law, 
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187; Samuel A. Marcosson, 
Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 
GEO. L.J. 1 (1992); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the 
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995); Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking 
Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67 (2000); I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1158 (1991); Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing 
Gender-Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
465. 
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D. Bootstrapping Vegetarianism 
The lesson of Pacifico‘s case is that sex discrimination sometimes 
manifests as other forms of discrimination—in this case, as a hybrid of 
vegetarian and sexual orientation discrimination. In this respect, Pacifico‘s 
case reveals a fundamental limitation of Title VII‘s discriminatory 
causation analysis: the mismatch between the legal regulation of 
discrimination and the lived experience of discrimination. Discrimination 
law is categorical in nature, dividing traits into discrete boxes. As 
Pacifico‘s case demonstrates, however, the lived experience of 
discrimination is messy, often involving a mixture of intersecting traits, 
some of which may even be proxies for other traits. Faced with a 
discrimination law regime that favors simplicity, courts tend to be 
suspicious of complex sex discrimination cases. Rather than dig into the 
substance of these complex cases, courts opt instead for an easy out—the 
bootstrapping logic.
149
  
If Pacifico were to pursue a remedy under Title VII, he would surely 
fall victim to the bootstrapping logic. His chances of convincing a court 
that he faced actionable sex discrimination, and not vegetarian or sexual 
orientation discrimination, are slim at best. Given the current state of sex 
discrimination law, Pacifico‘s claim is likely to go nowhere because the 
discriminator in his case called him ―gay‖ and ―vegetarian homo.‖ 
Because these words refer to traits that are not protected under Title VII, 
most courts will view these cases through the lens of the bootstrapping 
logic. The problem with the bootstrapping logic is that it gives too much 
weight to unprotected traits in the discriminatory causation analysis, 
enabling these traits to spoil what would otherwise be actionable sex 
discrimination claims. The root cause of the problem here is that courts 
have not developed a sophisticated way to synthesize discrimination cases 
involving multiple layers of discriminatory intent. My goal in the 
remainder of this Article is to propose a new framework to sharpen Title 
VII‘s antidiscrimination project, one that is particularly attuned to the 
interplay between protected and unprotected traits in sex discrimination 
law.  
 
 
 149. I discuss this phenomenon in great detail in an earlier work. See Zachary A. Kramer, Some 
Preliminary Thoughts on Title VII’s Intersexions, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 31 (2006). 
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III. A NEW APPROACH 
The bootstrapping logic runs counter to one of the core principles of 
modern sex discrimination jurisprudence. This principle holds that, in 
enacting Title VII‘s sex provision, ―Congress intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from 
sex stereotypes.‖150 First announced by the Seventh Circuit in 1971, this 
principle has served as the foundation for a number of important 
innovations in sex discrimination law,
151
 including the Supreme Court‘s 
announcement of the gender-stereotyping theory in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.
152
 The bootstrapping logic stands as a limit on this principle, 
preventing Title VII‘s sex provision from stamping out gender stereotypes 
that implicate unprotected traits, such as the stereotype at work in Ryan 
Pacifico‘s case. In this Part, I propose a doctrinal fix that will better enable 
sex discrimination law to capture gender-stereotyping claims that 
implicate unprotected traits. The thrust of this claim is that unprotected 
traits should be neutral for purposes of proving a discrimination claim. In 
practice, this means that an unprotected trait should neither serve as the 
basis for an actionable claim nor spoil an otherwise actionable claim. 
A. Trait Neutrality 
The heart of statutory antidiscrimination law is the distinction between 
protected and unprotected traits.
153
 Indeed, the distinction between 
protected and unprotected traits is is one of the main differences between 
statutory antidiscrimination law and constitutional equality jurisprudence. 
Although existing constitutional norms single out certain traits for special 
protection,
154
 all traits receive at least some level of protection under the 
 
 
 150. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). 
 151. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (holding that 
same-sex sexual harassment claims are actionable under Title VII); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (holding that Title VII covers hostile environment sexual harassment cases); 
City of L.A., Dep‘t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (establishing the 
standards, in an early and important case, for a status-based sex discrimination claim). Note that these 
are just a few citations from Supreme Court opinions. A Westlaw search uncovered hundreds of 
citations of this principle by appellate and district courts. 
 152. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 153. See infra Part I.A (discussing Title VII‘s treatment of protected and unprotected traits). 
 154. The Court has used some form of heightened scrutiny—whether strict or intermediate—in 
reviewing race, national origin, alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (sex); 
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (nonmarital parentage). Conversely, the Court has denied 
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rational basis test.
155
 Statutory antidiscrimination law, by contrast, is far 
more limited in scope. It seeks only to protect discrimination aimed at a 
small handful of protected traits. Traits that fall outside the protective 
umbrella receive no protection whatsoever, making them fair game as a 
basis for an employment decision. The dominant tradition in American 
employment law is at-will employment.
156
 In an at-will regime, employers 
and employees are equally free to terminate the employment relationship 
at any time and without cause.
157
 Because it imposes a limit on the at-will 
employment, statutory antidiscrimination law is designed to be a decidedly 
narrow undertaking. 
Even though they are crucial to the inner-workings of statutory 
antidiscrimination law, we have no theory of unprotected traits. And in the 
absence of a workable theory, the bootstrapping logic has stepped into the 
void. The bootstrapping logic promotes a skewed view of unprotected 
traits, treating them as landmines in the discriminatory causation analysis, 
armed to explode the employee‘s claim at the slightest mention of an 
unprotected trait. This approach gives unprotected traits more weight in 
the discriminatory causation analysis than they deserve. The mere 
presence of an unprotected trait in a case should not preclude a court from 
digging into the substance of the employee‘s claim. Ultimately, the critical 
question in a discrimination case is whether there is a nexus between the 
challenged employment action and a protected trait. The problem with 
bootstrapping logic is that it prevents courts from even considering 
whether that nexus exists in a given case. 
This is not to say that unprotected traits should be able to serve as the 
basis for an actionable discrimination claim. My proposal is that 
unprotected traits be treated as neutral for purposes of proving a 
discrimination claim. By neutral, I mean that they should neither serve as 
the basis for an actionable claim nor spoil an otherwise actionable claim. 
 
 
heightened protection to other traits. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985) (mental disability); Mass Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (age); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (indigency). 
 155. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). We can see this at work, for instance, in Romer v. Evans, 
where the Court struck down under the Equal Protection Clause a Colorado constitutional amendment 
that prohibited any level of state government from creating antidiscrimination protection for sexual 
orientation. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 156. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions 
of Legal Protections in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997); Joseph E. Slater, The 
“American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 53 (2007); Clyde W. 
Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 65 (2000). 
 157. See Payne v. The W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). 
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Such an approach is more consistent with the structural design of statutory 
antidiscrimination law, as it renders unprotected traits irrelevant to the 
critical inquiry of whether the alleged discrimination targeted a protected 
trait. The goal of this approach is to assimilate the complexities of the 
lived experience of discrimination into the rigid categories of existing 
employment discrimination doctrine. At a time when discrimination is 
becoming increasingly hard to categorize, it is all the more necessary to 
stay focused on the central purpose of statutory antidiscrimination law: 
stamping out discrimination based on protected traits. My approach 
prevents the bootstrapping logic from frustrating this task. 
B. The Framework in Action 
This new approach is not entirely foreign to sex discrimination law. A 
few courts have adopted reasoning similar to my proposed approach, 
though without formally identifying it as such.
158
 This part will describe 
one such case in the hope of bolstering my proposal that unprotected traits 
should be neutral for purposes of proving a discrimination claim. The case 
involves a transgender employee who brought a gender-stereotyping claim 
against his former employer.
159
 The case is especially instructive here 
because the court engaged in a rigorous discussion about the different 
parts of the employee‘s identity and how those parts affected the substance 
of the employee‘s sex discrimination claim. 
The employee in the case was Jimmie Smith, a lieutenant in the Salem 
Fire Department, in Salem, Ohio.
160
 Smith was suspended after informing 
the department that he was transitioning from male to female and, as a part 
of that process, would soon begin dressing in women‘s clothing and taking 
on an otherwise feminine appearance in the workplace.
161
 Rather than fire 
Smith directly, the department hatched a plan to get Smith to quit of his 
 
 
 158. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) (allowing a transgender plaintiff to 
raise an actionable gender-stereotyping claim); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 
2008) (holding that an employee‘s status as transgender does not preclude the employee from raising 
an actionable sex discrimination claim); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(permitting a gay employee to raise an actionable gender-stereotyping claim); Heller v. Columbia 
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002) (same). 
 159. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 160. Id. at 568.  
 161. Id. Although Smith ultimately transitioned from male to female, I will use the male pronouns 
―he‖ and ―him‖ throughout this part. I realize doing so may seem insensitive to Smith‘s wishes. That is 
certainly not my intent. I have chosen to use male pronouns because they are more consistent with 
Smith‘s theory of discrimination, namely, that he was discriminated against because he was a man 
expressing a female gender identity. 
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own accord.
162
 The department planned to order Smith to undergo three 
separate psychological evaluations, thinking that he would either resign or 
refuse to undergo the evaluations, in which case they could fire him for 
insubordination.
163
 Upon hearing of the department‘s plan, Smith hired a 
lawyer, who contacted the department to discuss Smith‘s situation.164 The 
department suspended Smith shortly after he hired the attorney.
165
 
Smith brought a gender-stereotyping claim against the department, 
alleging that the department discriminated against him because he failed to 
conform to stereotypical expectations about how a man should look and 
act.
166
 In a break from a long line of cases holding that transgender 
employees cannot raise actionable sex discrimination claims,
167
 the court 
held that Smith‘s transgender status did not preclude him from raising an 
actionable sex discrimination claim.
168
 More specifically, the court 
concluded that Price Waterhouse had ―eviscerated‖ the earlier transgender 
cases.
169
 Framing Smith‘s case in terms of sex discrimination rather than 
transgender discrimination, the court asserted that, after Price Waterhouse, 
―employers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses 
and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex 
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but for the 
victim‘s sex.‖170 Nor did it matter, according to the court, that Smith was 
transgender:
171
 ―Sex stereotyping based on a person‘s gender non-
 
 
 162. Id. at 568–69. 
 163. Id. at 569. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 570–71. 
 167. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Sommers v. Budget 
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 74-1904, 1 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 
403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
 168. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75. 
 169. Id. at 573. 
 170. Id. at 574. 
 171. See id. In its discussion of Smith‘s claim, the court goes on to demonstrate the faulty thinking 
of the bootstrapping logic:  
[T]he man who acts in ways typically associated with women is not described as engaging in 
the same activity as a woman who acts in ways typically associated with women, but is 
instead described as engaging in the different activity of being a transsexual (or in some 
instances, a homosexual or transvestite). Discrimination against the transsexual is then found 
not to be discrimination ―because of . . . sex,‖ but rather, discrimination against the plaintiff‘s 
unprotected status or mode of self-identification. In other words, these courts superimpose 
classifications such as ―transsexual‖ on a plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination based 
on the plaintiff‘s gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly 
unprotected classification. 
Id. 
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conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the 
cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‗transsexual,‘ is not fatal to a sex 
discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because 
of his or her gender non-conformity.‖172 
The Smith court‘s analysis is instructive as to how a court should 
approach Ryan Pacifico‘s discrimination claim. Much like transgenderism 
in Smith‘s case, vegetarianism is not an isolated status, but rather a ―label‖ 
identifying the cause of Pacifico‘s gender nonconformity. It is, in other 
words, a proxy for effeminacy. Like the framework I have proposed in this 
Article, the Smith court‘s approach renders the proxy trait neutral for 
purposes of assessing the causation question in the underlying sex 
discrimination claim. The advantage of such an approach is that it charts a 
path for a court to make good on the principle, discussed above, that Title 
VII‘s sex provision seeks to capture the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women flowing from gender stereotypes.
173
 Existing 
sex discrimination norms fall short of this principle because courts have 
generally failed to understand that an employee can be transgender or gay 
or vegetarian and still be a gender nonconformist. My new framework 
improves on existing norms, as it offers a way for sex discrimination law 
to consider multiples axes of discriminatory intent. When a court considers 
a gender-stereotyping claim, the court should judge the claim based not on 
the plaintiff‘s identity, but on whether the alleged discrimination was 
motivated by stereotypical gender expectations. 
C. Concerns 
Before concluding the Article, this part responds to two anticipated 
critiques of the argument presented thus far. The first claims that my trait 
neutrality framework expands the scope of the gender-stereotyping theory 
far beyond what Congress intended for the sex provision—so far, in fact, 
that it transforms all discrimination into sex discrimination. The second 
critique argues that my argument—including both the alternative reading 
of Pacifico‘s claim and the trait neutrality framework—makes the question 
of discriminatory intent too complicated, rendering the discriminatory 
causation requirement an unreliable evaluation of whether an employer 
has engaged in unlawful discrimination.  
 
 
 172. Id. at 575. 
 173. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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1. Everything Is Sex Discrimination 
The first concern charges that my trait neutrality approach takes the 
gender-stereotyping theory far beyond what Congress intended the scope 
of Title VII‘s sex provision to cover. This concern is rooted in cultural 
attitudes about gender. Because gender norms are such a dominant force in 
our culture, gender has become a prism through which we can view nearly 
every behavior or trait. My project exploits the cultural predominance of 
gender norms by permitting unprotected traits to serve as a proxy for 
gender. And if there is no limit on which unprotected traits can serve as a 
proxy for gender, then every behavior or trait can be read through the lens 
of gender, which means that every adverse employment action is sex 
discrimination. If taken to this extreme, the gender-stereotyping theory 
will eventually swallow the at-will employment rule. 
This is an important point, as it suggests that we need a concrete limit 
on the reach of the gender-stereotyping theory. It is certainly true that my 
argument makes it possible for Title VII‘s sex discrimination provision to 
capture more discriminatory harms than are currently recognized under 
existing sex discrimination norms. To the extent that this is a concern, 
however, the source of the problem lies not with my framework, but rather 
with the gender-stereotyping theory itself. When the Court created the 
gender-stereotyping theory in Price Waterhouse, it articulated the theory 
in the broadest of terms. The Court did not propose any limits on the reach 
of the theory, nor did it suggest that the theory should bend to any 
overriding principles of justice. If anything, the Court‘s formulation is too 
simple in its breadth: an employer cannot punish an employee for 
engaging in behavior that does not conform to the employer‘s 
stereotypical gender expectations.
174
 
My goal in this Article is not to chart new terrain for the gender-
stereotyping theory, but rather to apply the theory to a class of cases that 
should already fall within its scope. The bootstrapping logic imposes an 
 
 
 174. Indeed, the breadth and apparent simplicity of the Court‘s analysis probably explains why 
scholars have developed such differing accounts of the gender-stereotyping theory. Compare Mary 
Anne C. Case, supra note 19 (arguing that the gender-stereotyping theory is best understood as 
imposing an equality demand for male and female employees), with Yuracko, supra note 21 (rejecting 
Case‘s equality view of gender stereotyping in favor of a trait neutrality approach). Other scholars 
have argued that we should scrap the existing gender-stereotyping theory altogether. See, e.g., 
Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 133 (2010) (proposing a rule-based 
approach to generalizations about the sexes). Other scholars have sought to bring order to the chaotic 
stereotyping jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 
591 (2011) (developing a framework to fit Price Waterhouse and its progeny in a larger context about 
harmful comments in the workplace). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
320 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:287 
 
 
 
 
arbitrary limit on the gender-stereotyping theory, thereby precluding 
whole groups of employees from seeking relief under Title VII because 
they belong to social groups organized around traits that are not protected 
under the statute. If we are going to continue allowing employees to raise 
gender-stereotyping claims, then we must accept that the theory is 
exceptionally broad in scope, capturing a wide universe of discriminatory 
harms. It is certainly worth considering that the gender-stereotyping 
theory, as first articulated in Price Waterhouse, sweeps too far in its scope. 
Such an inquiry is, however, beyond the scope of this Article. 
2. Muddying Intent 
The second potential critique focuses on Title VII‘s discriminatory 
intent requirement. More specifically, this critique charges that my 
argument—including both the alternative reading of Pacifico‘s claim and 
the trait neutrality framework—muddies the discriminatory intent analysis, 
making it too easy for a court to find a violation of Title VII. The thrust of 
this critique is that my argument transforms unprotected status 
discrimination—in this case, vegetarianism and/or sexual orientation—
into actionable sex discrimination by substituting my view of what 
happened in the case for the discriminator‘s actual intent. To support this 
critique, one might argue that a court should not look beyond the actual 
words used by the discriminator, as they provide the best lens into the 
mindset of the discriminator at the time of the challenged employment 
action. At its core, this critique challenges the veracity of gender proxies 
as evidence of discriminatory intent. It reasons that we should trust and 
rely on the words used by a discriminator as the best indicator of the 
discriminator‘s motivations. Another way of framing this critique is to say 
that courts should not use proxies to substitute a presumed intent for the 
discriminator‘s actual intent.  
As with the first critique, this concern has more to do with the nature of 
employment discrimination law in general than with the specifics of my 
project in this Article. The problem with this critique is that it expects too 
much and too little from employment discrimination law‘s discriminatory 
causation analysis. Unless a discriminator openly admits to engaging in 
unlawful discrimination, it is nearly impossible to determine what a 
discriminator‘s actual intent was in a given case. The discriminatory intent 
requirement is, at best, a useful tool for flushing out bad motives in 
discrimination cases. At the same time, even though it is saddled by this 
inherent evidentiary limitation, the discriminatory causation analysis is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/1
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nevertheless capable of weeding out when a trait is being used as a proxy 
for another form of discrimination.  
Take age discrimination.
175
 As part of their causation inquiry in age 
discrimination cases, courts routinely consider the question of whether an 
employer‘s proffered reason for a challenged employment action is really 
a proxy for age discrimination.
176
 For instance, say that the employer 
refuses to hire a potential employee because she is ―overqualified‖ for the 
open position.
177
 One account of the employer‘s intent is that this decision 
was based on the potential employee‘s qualifications. This would be a 
legal basis for making an employment decision because employee 
qualification is not a protected trait under existing discrimination norms. 
An alternative account of the employer‘s intent is that the employer is 
using the potential employee‘s qualifications as a proxy to screen out older 
employees, which would be an illegal basis for making an employment 
decision.
178
 A court‘s job in this case would be to weigh these competing 
accounts of the employer‘s intent, taking into account the facts uncovered 
during litigation. 
That proxies have proved manageable in age discrimination cases 
suggests that they can also work in sex discrimination cases. Thus there is 
no reason to think that gender proxies will water down the discriminatory 
intent requirement. Moreover, thinking of discriminatory intent in terms of 
proxy traits will actually sharpen a court‘s causation analysis, providing a 
new tool courts can use to ferret out gender bias. In the face of the already 
hard task of determining whether a challenged employment action was 
 
 
 175. Age discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII, but by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633(a) (2006). The ADEA tracks Title VII‘s coverage in 
large part; the only critical difference, for purposes of this Article, is that the only trait protected under 
the statute is age, which captures employees who are forty and older. Id.  
 176. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (holding that firing an employee 
before the employee‘s retirement plan vests is analytically distinct from age discrimination, though not 
foreclosing that other age-related traits can serve as a proxy for age discrimination); EEOC v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 288 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving situation where employer 
prepared a ―justification‖ for layoff of employee who had ―skills suited to the ‗pre-electronic‘ era and 
that he would have to be brought ‗up to speed‘ on ‗new trends of advertising with electronic means‘‖); 
Taggart v. Time Inc., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving situation where employer rejected a 
potential employee on grounds that he was ―overqualified‖ for the advertised position). 
 177. Taggart, 924 F.3d at 45. 
 178. The court in Taggart ruled this way, concluding that being overqualified ―is simply to 
employ a euphemism to mask the real reason for refusal, namely, in the eyes of the employer the 
applicant is too old.‖ Id. at 47. Other courts have come to the same conclusion. See EEOC v. D.C., 
Dep‘t of Human Servs., 729 F. Supp. 907, 915 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding that ―overqualified‖ and 
―overspecialized‖ are buzzwords for ―too old‖); Vaughn v. Mobil Oil Corp., 708 F. Supp. 595, 601 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the use of ―overqualified‖ suggested that the employee was capable of 
assuming another position at the company). 
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―because of‖ sex, gender proxies are a constructive device for not only 
better describing the lived experience of discrimination, but also capturing 
a wider universe of discriminatory harms.  
CONCLUSION 
Sex discrimination law is at a crossroads. While Title VII has done 
much to combat formal sex discrimination, the gender-stereotyping 
theory—perhaps the most transformative theory of sex discrimination—
has stalled in recent years, a casualty of the bootstrapping logic. This 
Article uses the cultural relationship between meat and manhood to 
critique the central premise of the bootstrapping logic, namely, that an 
unprotected trait can overwhelm an otherwise actionable sex 
discrimination claim. In place of the bootstrapping logic, this Article 
proposes a new theory of unprotected traits built around the idea that 
unprotected traits should be irrelevant for purposes or proving an 
actionable discrimination claim. As such, an unprotected trait should 
neither serve as the basis for an actionable claim nor spoil an otherwise 
actionable claim. Yet courts should not ignore unprotected traits entirely, 
as unprotected traits often serve as proxies for protected traits. Ultimately, 
courts should undertake their causation analysis in a holistic fashion, 
recognizing that discrimination is messy, often involving a mixture of 
protected and unprotected traits. 
In terms of a broader contribution, this Article lays the foundation for a 
more expansive conversation about the future of sex discrimination law. 
Workplaces have become increasingly diverse in recent years, as more and 
more social groups have become visible through social movements.
179
 The 
cost of such diversity, however, is that these groups are often the target of 
bias and discrimination. Given the emergence of these new social groups 
and the structural limits of existing employment discrimination norms, 
there is a very real possibility that sex discrimination law may be nearing 
its breaking point. My hope is that this Article will serve as a jumping-off 
point for a larger discussion about the future of sex discrimination law, 
specifically with respect to the capacity of the gender-stereotyping theory 
to capture new manifestations of gender bias.  
 
 
 179. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGHTEN A 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing that the workplace has become a critical site of social 
cooperation among a diverse workforce); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 747–48 (2011) (discussing the emergence of new identity groups through social 
movements). 
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